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CHINA’S CLOSING WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Justin Bernier and Stuart Gold
Conventional wisdom says that the People’s Republic of China is, for better orworse, recovering its place as a major power on the world stage. To its
citizens and leaders, many of whom regard the Middle Kingdom’s decline in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a historical anomaly and its modern
resurgence as a national priority, this renewed stature means a larger economic,
political, and military role for China in East Asia and beyond. It also means
Taiwan’s return to the PRC fold, without which China’s destiny will remain un-
realized in the hearts and minds of most mainlanders.
Many analysts and cogent observers have already concluded that history is on
China’s side in the struggle over Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province.
As China’s size and strength continue to grow in the
Asia-Pacific region, they say, Taiwan will have little choice
but to yield—on its own terms if the fledgling democracy
is lucky and wise. The same China watchers quickly point
to the PRC’s steady military buildup and substantial,
albeit uneven,economic growth as proof that today’s rela-
tively weak Beijing will in due course develop the muscle
it needs either to take the twenty-three-million-strong
Republic of China forcibly or pressure Taipei into accept-
ing a Hong Kong–like arrangement. Most estimates put
the inevitable day of reckoning somewhere between ten
and twenty years from now, when China’s military and
economic engines are expected to overshadow those of
most of its regional neighbors, if not Japan.
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A more realistic, comprehensive examination of the pertinent trends reveals a
different future. An attempted blockade and limited missile campaign—the
most plausible attack scenario—would be more likely to produce China’s de-
sired results in this decade than in the next. By 2010, the guardian United States
will have strengthened its military position in the western Pacific relative to
China, and a defensively stronger Taipei will have fully embraced, if not institu-
tionalized, Taiwan’s increasingly popular “status quo” approach to cross-strait
affairs, further marginalizing the idea of reunification. Added to other unmis-
takable trends, such an environment will make a PRC move on Taiwan exponen-
tially riskier. The conservative defense planners in Beijing almost certainly
realize this. If Chinese aggression in East Asia is to be deterred, Taiwan and the
United States must also recognize and prepare for this alternate reality.
TAIWAN’S STATUS QUO CONSENSUS
Happy on average with its national identity and way of life today, Taiwan is un-
likely to join voluntarily an authoritarian, economically unpredictable PRC, ab-
sent some use of force by the mainland. Never cordial neighbors, the two parties’
differences have hardened in recent years, while the Republic of China’s success-
ful democratic experiment has tipped the domestic political scale in favor of the
status quo, perhaps forever.
At the heart of this political shift is the breakdown of the pro-reunification
Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, Beijing’s best hope for a peaceful merger.
Plagued by infighting and mass defections to splinter factions after half a cen-
tury of uninterrupted rule, the party of the ROC’s “founding father,” Chiang
Kai-shek, lost its majority in the parliament for the first time in history in De-
cember 2001, surrendering almost half its seats. Following a disappointing
third-place finish in the presidential race one year earlier, the shocking loss was
widely blamed on the Kuomintang leadership’s decision to remain faithful to the
party’s historical, but increasingly unpopular, commitment to reunification.
The new government is led by native-born Chen Shui-ben. His Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) had made periodic assertions of defiance—such as
Chen’s now-famous pronouncement to an American interviewer that “Taiwan
is an independent country,” or his coy support for a national referendum on in-
dependence—each of which prompted warnings from Beijing. However, the
DPP, which downplayed its independence proclivities near the end of its journey
from the minority to the majority, has demonstrated no measurable interest in a
serious showdown since taking power two years ago.1 Like a plurality of Taiwan’s
citizens, Taipei’s new leadership appears satisfied with the status quo, a position
tantamount to independence but without the pitfalls of a formal declaration.
“Status quo” is congenial to most Taiwanese voters, who no longer see
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reunification as desirable, or even practical, given their growing prosperity and
expanding political rights, and it has been reinforced by events in Hong Kong
that have called Beijing’s trustworthiness into question—including the reap-
pointment of an unpopular chief executive and his fourteen “ministers” for a
second five-year term without even the pretense of an election. With most voters
in favor of maintaining the present state of affairs, the Kuomintang must ac-
cordingly water down its reunification stance in future elections if it hopes to re-
main competitive on the national stage. Even China’s new president, Hu Jintao,
has conceded (as vice president) that a majority of islanders favor maintaining
the status quo, though he said that Taiwanese polls show the number of reunifi-
cation advocates rising—a claim refuted by Taipei and most surveys, which put
support for Chinese rule under a “one country, two system” model safely below
10 percent.2
Taiwanese public opinion on reunification is in fact surprisingly steady,
though pro–status quo figures are misleadingly small. In 2001, reunification op-
ponents—those who ultimately want independence or the status quo forever—
collectively polled around 40 percent. Merger advocates, Taiwanese who favor
reunification either now or later, showed only half as well, with those backing
“reunification now” perennially under 5 percent.3 About one in three Taiwanese
are for “maintaining the status quo to decide unification or independence in the
future”;4 but this group is probably more “status quo now” than “decision later”
at heart.5 Polling by the official Mainland Affairs Council indicates that many
Taiwanese citizens who say they want to decide the matter later actually reject
the most—maybe only—plausible peaceful reunification scenario. The council
demonstrated that “when Beijing’s formula of ‘one country, two systems’ for re-
solving cross-strait issues is clearly spelled out (that Taiwan is a local govern-
ment, subject to the rule of the Beijing government, and the ROC [Republic of
China] government no longer exists”—something akin to the Hong Kong
deal—70 to 74 percent of respondents rejected the measure.6 A separate
think-tank survey shows the Taiwanese people equally united against forced re-
unification, with more than three-quarters of respondents willing to defend the
nation if China launched an attack to take it over and only 10 percent unwilling
to bear arms.7 At least a sizable majority of Taiwan, it reasons, opposes Beijing’s
demands for political merger by peaceful and violent means alike, even if most
do not clamor for traditional independence.
Predictably, the voters have rewarded Taiwan’s like-minded political parties.
To be sure, the DPP’s political fortunes might dissipate were the charismatic
presidential hopeful James Soong and his People First Party to revitalize the
“pan-blue” alliance—those parties that support eventual reunification—by
merging with the cash-rich Kuomintang, but a DPP loss would probably be
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immaterial. Besides Soong’s support for “one roof ” with “two seats” (an implied
call for delaying reunification), public opinion is no longer a secondary consid-
eration of Taiwanese politicians.8 Whoever wins the ruling seat, Taiwan’s new,
truly multiparty democracy promises to represent better the pro–status quo ma-
jority, a consensus that developed under the previous authoritarian regime, be-
fore the island’s first lawful change of power. As one observer put it, “When the
Kuomintang was in power, the authorities refused to adopt a new separate iden-
tity because it could cost them their legal basis”—that Taipei was in fact China’s
legitimate government—“however false it was, for ruling.”9 Today, Taiwanese
voters can freely realize a cross-strait policy that better reflects their own opin-
ions and desires, if not necessarily those of Beijing. So far, they have done so
in both of Taiwan’s open presidential contests, electing closet independence-
advocate Lee Teng-hui in 1996, four years before Chen’s victory forced mainland
leaders to consider the possibility that the runaway province might never will-
ingly return.
BEIJING’S SOLITARY OPTION
Implicit threats of violence have failed to steer Taipei and its constituents toward
serious reunification talks. In March 1996, Taiwan’s first-ever presidential elec-
tions went forward despite missile tests aimed at draining support for Lee, the
eventual winner with 54 percent in a field of four candidates. A year earlier, simi-
lar intimidation tactics had failed to influence the island’s parliamentary elec-
tions in the PRC’s imagined favor. Both times the Beijing-preferred Kuomintang
party suffered losses, while public support for independence or the status quo
stayed safely above 66 percent (defiantly rising one year). In each instance, Tai-
wanese support for reunification briefly peaked as high as 27 percent—unusu-
ally inflated numbers, but hardly the groundswell for which Beijing had
apparently gambled.10 Frustrated and humiliated by such political backfires,
Beijing refuses to renounce violence against Taiwan, one of its official defense
white papers declaring a readiness to “adopt all drastic measures, including the
use of force, to . . . achieve the great cause of reunification” if the Republic of
China declares independence or drags its feet in negotiations.11 Fortunately for
defense planners in Washington and Taipei, Beijing’s plausible military options
are as narrow as its threats are vague.
The most dramatic but least feasible PRC threat is an amphibious attack with
hundreds of thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops supported by
ballistic missile barrages, aircraft, naval forces, and all manner of modified mer-
chant ships. A host of analysts and government reports have poured cold water
on this frequently discussed scenario, revealing China’s sea and airlift short-
comings, the numerous force-concentration problems associated with Formosa
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beach landings, and, not the least, Taiwan’s super-hardened land defenses. Piers
Wood and Charles Ferguson, for example, persuasively argue that China lacks
not only the amphibious assault ships to bridge the strait with enough firepower
and men but also the port capacity to employ hundreds of potentially useful ci-
vilian craft.12 Their conclusion was shared by Admiral Dennis Blair, former com-
mander of the U.S. Pacific forces, who not long ago reported that “the PLA is still
years away from the capability to take and hold Taiwan.”13
By comparison, a naval blockade could bring Taiwan to its knees with relative
ease and minimal international protest. A sustained interruption of key sea lines
of communications would be economically disastrous for the Taiwanese econ-
omy, which relies heavily on shipping for its lifeblood trade and energy needs,
some two-thirds of which are fulfilled by fossil fuel imports.14 Even a temporary
closure would likely prove debilitating for the import/export-dependent econ-
omy. Shortly prior to Taiwan’s 1996 election, for example, all merchant marine
traffic to Taiwan was halted for days after China fired several unarmed DF-15
short-range missiles toward the island’s two largest ports, the closest of them
falling approximately twelve miles from land. Traffic into Taiwan’s northern
port was similarly blocked the previous year after China lobbed six DF-15s into
the strait some eighty-five miles north of the island.15
China’s green-water navy could isolate Taiwan using mines, surface ships, and
even state-sponsored piracy—an unconventional yet effective tool in the dan-
gerous South China Sea. As sunken or stolen cargo raised sensitive shipping and
insurance costs to prohibitive levels, a blockade strategy would almost certainly
trigger price spikes overnight, causing shortages and rushes on stores soon
thereafter. Chinese mines, ranging from older contact types to more modern
command-activated models that lie in wait for specific acoustic signatures,
could block harbor and port entrances as well as shipping lanes (though Beijing
might be reluctant to permanently close those shipping lanes on which it too
depends). The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) possesses submarines,
aircraft, and over forty major surface ships capable of laying mines, in addition
to some two hundred smaller vessels available for lesser mining roles.16 In the
words of the Communist Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, “Surface warship,
submarine, airplane, merchant ship and even sampan can all be used to deploy
mines,” which then become the “dragon in water.”17
There is currently little Taiwan could do in response to an aggressive undersea
campaign. With at most a dozen outdated counter–mine warfare ships at hand
(though it may buy some American minesweeping helicopters), Taiwan would
be hard pressed to clear any sizable minefields, known or suspected.18 The ROC
navy’s submarine force is similarly outmatched. Its four diesel models—two
dating from the 1940s—and nominal antisubmarine capabilities could not
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seriously challenge China’s force of seventy submarines, the best of which in-
clude four Russian-built Kilo-class boats (though two may be seriously dam-
aged) and five nuclear-powered units of the Han class.19 Taiwan’s fleet will be
even less effective against the Hans’ eventual replacement, the Type 093 nuclear-
powered attack submarine, which will be operational sometime after 2005.
Reflecting Russian influence and technology, the Type 093 will carry potent
wire-guided and wake-homing “fire and forget” torpedoes as well as cruise mis-
siles.20 Beyond procurement, China’s submarine training program concentrates
“on concealment and ambush procedures, formation attacks, long-range de-
ployments, minelaying and torpedo strikes against surface shipping.”21
Taiwan is equally unprepared today for a traditional blockade by the Chinese
surface fleet, which is numerically and qualitatively superior. Its newest ad-
ditions, two Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers fitted with the super-
sonic Sunburn ship-killing cruise missiles, present an edge over anything
Taiwan has sent to sea this decade. News that Russia will deliver to China by 2005
or 2006 another two Sovremennys, probably fitted with the even deadlier
186-mile-range Yakhont antiship cruise missile, makes a bad situation worse (if
they can be put on target).22 In contrast, Taiwan’s surface fleet is still based on
older Harpoon-armed American ships and a handful of readiness-plagued
French La Fayette frigates with missile defenses outclassed by both the Sunburn
and the Yakhont. Though useful and capable in many other respects, Taiwan’s
four Kidd-class destroyers will not appreciably alter the surface warfare balance
in the narrow strait. These ships are outranged by China’s Russian-made cruise
missiles and lack the means to detect them early enough to engage them with
their Standard missiles. (The proposed tactic—dubbed “open-seas mobility”—
for dealing with the new threat is reportedly to deploy the Kidds far from the strait,
in the vicinity of Guam.)23 The Sovremenny, with only modest 1970s-era defenses,
is vulnerable to U.S. air and submarine attack, but if the ROC navy challenged a
PLAN blockade alone, hostilities could not be expected to last long.24
NEGOTIATIONS AT MISSILE-POINT
An effective blockade alone could lead to economic collapse and panic, but a
bigger push might be required to convince a stubborn Taiwan to accept reunifi-
cation. Beijing may believe that a limited but sustained ballistic missile cam-
paign could provide the final inducement. According to a famous news story,
just before the March 1996 missile tests a Pentagon official returned from China
and reported to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake that he had learned
that the Politburo had plans prepared for a rocket attack against Taiwan consist-
ing of one conventional strike a day for thirty days.25 The idea was presumably
to make a panicked public force Taipei into an agreement favorable to the
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mainland. Though the threat may have been planted, coming as it did shortly
before Taiwan’s presidential election, it nonetheless demonstrated China’s ap-
parent willingness to pursue reunification in such a way.
Accurate missiles would be an integral part of this strategy. Much has been
said about China’s missile buildup in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan, where
the Second Artillery Corps is adding some fifty missiles a year to its estimated
arsenal of 350 (as of July 2002) mobile short-range ballistic missiles.26 Once
fully integrated with satellite-aided guidance systems, as expected, these weap-
ons will transform China’s growing short-range missile stockpile from a clumsy
political tool into a paralyzing military threat also capable of reliably hitting
prime economic and population centers. To name targets beforehand, such as
office complexes, airports, and key industrial hubs—concentrated civilian fuel
reserves could be wiped out with a few ballistic missiles, according to Taiwan’s
defense minister—would have an immeasurable effect on morale, possibly even
dissolving the island population’s will and ability to resist.27 China boasts plans
to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) on its M-type missiles, which likely
include the Dong Feng 15 (or DF-15, also known as the M-9) and another
short-range rocket, the DF-11 (or M-11).28 In fact, the accuracy of the DF-15—
deployed in Fujian, and the missile used in the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait mis-
sile tests—has already been improved with navigation data from the U.S. GPS
constellation.29
A large and accurate missile barrage could do incalculable damage to Tai-
wan’s defenses and infrastructure, but saturating the island with rockets and
land-attack cruise missiles—another type of weapon China is busily amass-
ing—would probably be counterproductive. Instead of complementing a block-
ade strategy to bring Taipei to the bargaining table once and for all, a full-scale
missile strike would likely inflame Taiwanese defiance and make the island a
martyr in the eyes of potential saviors. The United States, Australia, the United
Kingdom, and even the United Nations would be hard pressed to look away as
China pummeled Taiwan with high-explosive warheads or worse. Taiwan is now
essentially defenseless against a Chinese ballistic missile attack, but its plan to
buttress a very limited Patriot II theater missile defense system with the
third-generation Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) probably worries
Beijing, which would be embarrassed were Taiwan to shoot down a missile strike
during a blockade attempt.30 Although hardening defense facilities would prob-
ably be the most effective countermeasure to a missile attack, successful inter-
cepts could postpone a Taiwan collapse, affording Washington time to take
action. Partly in response, Beijing has deployed longer-range missiles, like the
GPS-guided DF-21, farther inland, where they can target Taiwan from a distance
that makes the forthcoming PAC-3 and other “lower tier” defenses ineffective.31
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This partial solution, or hedge, further explains Beijing’s emotionally charged
opposition to any deal that would bring more capable “upper tier” defenses, like
the Aegis-based Navy Theater Wide System, to Taiwan.
China may see alternatives to challenging the international community. A
limited missile strike—possibly coupled with debilitating special-operations at-
tacks—could plausibly remain below the threshold of “intervention,” especially
if U.S. forces were preoccupied. This last point is important because China un-
doubtedly understands that if American help does come, it would probably not
end at assistance in missile defense. Beijing appears to think that its current
long-range nuclear deterrent, momentarily based on some two dozen vulnera-
ble silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), is insufficient to deter
the United States from exercising force in a serious cross-strait crisis. The real-
ization probably drives not only Beijing’s opposition to a U.S. national missile
defense but also its own well-documented strategic modernization program,
which began in earnest sometime in the early 1990s, shortly after the Soviet
Union’s collapse allowed China to turn its attention to Taiwan.
China likely believes its future deterrent forces, based on mobile ICBMs like
the already serviceable, five-thousand-mile-range DF-31 and its longer-range
DF-41 version, can discourage a preemptive nuclear attack by the United States,
the secret nuclear doctrine of which reportedly lists China as “a country that
could be involved in an immediate or potential [nuclear] contingency.”32 Even
so, these improved weapons will only level the strategic playing field between the
two nuclear powers, protecting the Chinese homeland from strategic preemp-
tion and direct attack but little else. China has conveyed an implicit threat to
level America’s second-largest city should Washington interfere in a cross-strait
war—“Americans care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan,”
warned one Chinese general—but the United States has not shrunk in the past
from its security commitments, formal or otherwise, when nuclear exchanges
were possible and is unlikely to alter its engagement policies any time soon, bar-
ring a major turnabout in America’s global defense strategy.33
WIDENING THE MOAT
Political trends in the United States make it harder for Beijing to bully Taipei
into resuming reunification talks, which ended abruptly in 1999 after President
Lee Teng-hui, by outlining his groundbreaking “two states doctrine,” challenged
the “one China”understanding that Washington and Beijing had worked hard to
preserve since 1978. In the spring of 2002, President George W. Bush effectively
dumped “strategic ambiguity,” the decades-old policy of deterring Beijing from
attacking Taiwan while discouraging Taipei from recklessly moving toward in-
dependence. Administration officials have made it abundantly clear that U.S.
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policy still does not support a declaration of independence, but Bush’s sweeping
promise to do “whatever it takes” to help defend the island—the first time an
American president has made such a declaration on Chinese soil—ties U.S. and
Taiwanese security closer than perhaps at any time since the early 1970s, when
the island was Washington’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”34
The Bush administration has drawn dramatic distinctions between its Tai-
wan Strait policy and that of its predecessor, referring to its own posture as one
of “strategic clarity.” More tangibly, after Bush’s first Asian diplomatic swing
U.S. officials revealed that the White House had decided to put aside the previ-
ous administration’s “three noes”—no support for Taiwan’s independence; no
support for “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”; and no support for Tai-
wan’s membership in international organizations that required statehood. Re-
placing the old framework is the “six assurances,” the Ronald Reagan–era
security policy that emphasized unabated arms sales to Taiwan and a hands-off
approach to cross-strait negotiations. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly
brought this point home during a Florida conference speech in the presence of
Taiwan’s defense minister: “U.S. security policy continues to be embodied in the
‘six assurances’ offered to Taiwan by President Reagan. Today, as previously, we
will neither seek to mediate between the PRC and Taiwan, nor will we exert pres-
sure on Taiwan to come to the bargaining table. You can count on this.”
The State Department’s top East Asia official went on to underline Washing-
ton’s commitment to help Taipei meet its self-defense needs: “A secure and
self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more capable of engaging in political
interaction and dialogue with the PRC.”35 Coupled with Bush’s pledge to defend
the island from mainland aggression, this new policy structure leaves little to the
imagination, arguably reducing Taiwan’s incentive to deal with an impatient,
even angry, Beijing.
A change in the White House could alter this course, but parallel domestic
political developments ensure extension of the current policy far beyond 2004.
For instance, in 2002 a large, bipartisan group of members of the U.S. House of
Representatives founded the Congressional Taiwan Caucus to bolster the key-
stone 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the Pentagon to sell the island
enough arms to defend itself. The 113-member caucus (at last count) includes
dozens of representatives from key committees, including senior lawmakers ac-
tively engaged in Washington’s Taiwan and China policies. Congressional sup-
port for the Republic of China is not a passing fad; in 1999 the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act—cosponsored by an impressive seventy-seven members—
passed in the House 341 to seventy, reaffirming broad support in that body for
the Taiwan Relations Act. (The Senate never voted on the measure; its version of
the bill stalled in the Foreign Relations Committee amid strenuous Clinton
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administration appeals and warnings from Admiral Blair that it would cause
grave transpacific tensions. The legislation’s failure was not interpreted, how-
ever, as Senate disapproval.)
Support from the Taiwan Caucus and other key members of Congress will help
sustain the arms flow that gives teeth to this new arrangement. Bush’s approval
of the largest defense package to Taiwan since 1992, valued at nearly six billion
dollars, fell short of Taipei’s request for advanced seaborne missile defenses but
opened the door for the island to buy several big-ticket items, including eight
diesel-electric submarines, twelve antisubmarine P-3 Orion aircraft, Sea Dragon
minesweeping helicopters, and Kidd-class guided-missile destroyers, which are
expected to prepare its Navy to operate the theater-missile-defense-capable Aegis
destroyers.36 These “legacy” systems, plus the subsequently approved sale of thirty
Apache Longbow attack helicopters, prove that the Bush administration is making
good on its promise to normalize arms sales to the island and could very well help
Taiwan resist a naval blockade; their greatest benefit, however, will be more fre-
quent and substantive military exchanges with the United States. Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said as much at the Florida conference mentioned
above, when he counseled that military improvements, not multibillion-dollar
procurement deals, should be Taipei’s top defense priority and that the United
States is “eager to help” Taiwan improve its armed services’ procurement process,
training, and jointness—a shortcoming highlighted by recent war games there.37
The Bush administration also wants to help civilian Taipei master its control over
the military, long considered an extension of the Kuomintang.
On the world stage, U.S. diplomatic support for Taiwan has frustrated PRC
efforts to check an aggressive DPP campaign to gain admittance to prominent
international organizations. Though Chinese diplomats blocked Taiwan’s bid
for observer status in the World Health Organization—a possible precursor to
full UN membership, in Beijing’s eyes—the Bush administration successfully
lobbied for the island’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), al-
beit as a “separate customs territory,” and actively advocates its entry into other
international assemblies of sovereign states.
Building on this success and anxious to expand market-access measures al-
ready in place under the WTO, as well as rechannel tens of billions of dollars in
“China fever” investment outflows, Chen’s government enthusiastically wel-
comed news that a U.S. commission is carefully considering a free-trade agree-
ment with Taiwan, the tenth-largest American export market, immediately
behind China.38 Movement toward a bilateral trade deal—or trilateral zone were
Japan included, as Chen recommends—sends an unmistakable political mes-
sage to Beijing, that in a world where trade pacts may be more important than
state-to-state military treaties, an attack on Taiwan could amount to an attack
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on the American economy. Still, such an arrangement could be years away, de-
spite “fast track” trade negotiating authority and solid congressional support
from heartland senators like Iowa’s Charles Grassley, chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, and Max Baucus of Montana, ranking Democrat on the Fi-
nance Committee. A free trade agreement would likely boost by hundreds of
millions of dollars food exports to Taiwan, the fifth-largest market for U.S. agri-
culture products (ahead of China), but the failure of Taiwan so far to meet its ba-
sic WTO responsibilities, such as those related to intellectual-property issues,
rules out a deal any time soon.39 Nevertheless, movement in this direction tells
Beijing that the United States is deepening its investment in Taiwan’s well-being
at more than one level.
MASTERING A MATURING PLA
Closer political and formal economic ties, added to the reopening of Washing-
ton’s arms spigot after almost ten years of drought, are steadily reducing Tai-
wan’s susceptibility to mainland coercion and attack. However, a growing U.S.
defense presence in East Asia and improvements in the capability of Pacific
forces relative to the PLA will continue to present China with its greatest imped-
iment to a coercive reunification strategy.
Calling attention to “the possibility . . . that a military competitor with a for-
midable resource base will emerge in the region,” the report of the 2001 Qua-
drennial Defense Review (QDR), the Pentagon’s primary strategic roadmap,
calls for a “paradigm shift in force planning” that adds new and better military
capabilities to the Pacific theater, where long distances and access challenges
could prove costly in a major theater war.40 Citing an unnamed threat, the QDR
recommended that the United States add in the Pacific a second aircraft carrier
battle group, up to four new surface ships, submarines with cruise missiles, and
additional air bases. Indeed, the Navy has already “stood up” Submarine Squad-
ron 15 on Guam, more than three thousand miles west of Hawaii, allowing its
two Los Angeles–class attack submarines, the USS San Francisco (SSN 711) and
USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN 705)—USS Houston (SSN 713) will join them in
January 2004—to provide eighty-eight to 123 mission-days per year, compared
to thirty-six for Pearl Harbor–based boats.41 At the same time, innovative solu-
tions to surface-ship readiness problems, such as a tested “crew-swapping” idea
intended to eliminate transit time and extend deployments without punishing
sailors and their families, will provide regional combatant commanders with
270 additional days of surface combat power over a year-and-a-half period.42
This Asia-centric, “forward deterrence” defense policy, if fully adopted, as Bush
administration officials assure the public that it will be, would improve U.S. pro-
jection options and guarantee uninterrupted carrier-battle-group presence in
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the western Pacific. The latter has been dangerously absent in past regional cri-
ses, most recently when the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) left Japan for the Indian
Ocean to support operations in Afghanistan. The overall result should be a fur-
ther check upon Chinese ambitions.
New regional operating concepts will buttress these seaborne platforms and
reduce U.S. Pacific Command’s reliance on politically shaky basing agreements.
Central to these plans is the Air Force’s strategy of using Guam as a main operat-
ing base for tactical missions into the region from its periphery. Andersen Air
Force Base is ideal for its hardened facilities and for its distance from Taiwan
(nearly 1,500 nautical miles)—close enough to provide combat support over the
strait using new, longer-range fighters in conjunction with air “tanker bridges,”
but far enough away to limit the effectiveness of PLA missiles.43 Future U.S. ca-
pability improvements will only enhance this smarter, beefed-up western Pacific
presence. Better and more precise long-range air assets, including new stealth
bombers and standoff munitions, will allow American pilots to challenge the
PLA’s maturing anti-access strategy from safer distances; planned carrier-based un-
manned combat air vehicles and improved cruise missiles may be even less susceptible
to Chinese defenses.44 Under the sea and on the surface, astonishing American naval
advancements, like those incorporated in the revolutionary Virginia-class attack
submarines, continue to outpace PLAN’s near-term ambitions, which China’s mor-
ibund domestic arms industry has forced it to pin to foreign acquisitions.45
Some analysts, citing exotic Israeli and Russian-made hardware, counter that
high-profile acquisitions will so improve China’s anti-access capabilities that
defending the island could prove costly. Chinese strategy, they correctly argue,
is not to defeat the American military but to put Washington out of the fight
by disabling its major platforms or simply deterring intervention altogether.
Richard Fisher of the Jamestown Foundation, for example, argues that the PRC
is already gathering the appropriate forces to attack successfully a carrier battle
group in the vicinity of Taiwan (“Sink an aircraft carrier, win the war,” goes the
PLA mantra).46 Realistically, though, supersonic ship-killing cruise missiles and
other devices will only lengthen the time it takes U.S. forces to “kick down the
door.” Without trivializing the deadly threat such weapons pose to American
surface platforms and their crews, the U.S. ability to operate from ever-greater
distances and its unmatched battlespace awareness, to say nothing of forthcom-
ing ballistic and cruise-missile defenses, mean that Washington could spoil a
Chinese blockade even if it could not prevent one.
There is consensus even in Beijing that Washington can beat the PLA in its
own backyard. Dedicated students of U.S. warfighting capabilities and doctrine,
Chinese officers have carefully observed as American forces have repeatedly
proven their conventional superiority in diverse, hostile environments. If
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Operation DESERT STORM convinced the PLA that it lags decades behind, the
Serbia and Afghanistan air campaigns, with their historic rates of precision sor-
ties, real-time targeting, and casualty-free operations, convinced the leaders of
the PLA components that the capabilities and doctrine gap is growing (as must
have Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as well). Several Chinese officers have warily
noted how much U.S. capabilities grew in the brief seven years between the Per-
sian Gulf War and the air campaign over Kosovo. Tellingly, two of the PLA’s three
competing schools of thought—“Local War under High Tech Conditions” and
(especially) the “Revolution in Military Affairs”—argue that the United States is
decades ahead of the PLA in military technology.47
The gap is nowhere more evident than in China’s lagging intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance capabilities, which cannot yet help China “see over
the horizon,” a skill the PLA must master if it hopes to employ its new antiship
cruise missiles at their intended ranges. China is trying to close the divide by fo-
cusing on several other niche capabilities to exploit U.S. weaknesses, but forward-
looking war games consistently prove that the narrow tactical advantages it may
achieve with, say, advanced “double digit” surface-to-air missiles will be increas-
ingly insufficient to keep American forces at bay.
NO TIME LIKE THE PRESENT
Current trends make it increasingly difficult for China to intimidate Taiwan, let
alone make good on vociferous invasion threats. The United States is steadily
strengthening its projection capabilities, and Washington (both the White
House and Congress) is rekindling its “tropical island love affair.” At the same
time, Taiwan’s voters have all but divorced themselves from the idea of a peaceful
merger; years of mainland strong-arming and Hong Kong’s record-high unem-
ployment and political woes—including conspicuous human rights violations
and a reversal of democratic gains—have largely eroded what little public sup-
port remained for sincere one-China negotiations.48 Average Taiwanese citizens,
indications are, want the status quo—probably because of the political and eco-
nomic risks associated with joining the authoritarian regime, but also because
most were born and raised in a self-determined Republic of China. Little is ex-
pected to change on these fronts any time soon. Washington’s basic support for
Taiwan is as calculated as it is bipartisan, a strategic decision based on long-term
interests that cannot willingly be ceded to a would-be regional aggressor. Entre-
preneurial and independent minded, today’s Taiwan appears equally predis-
posed to de facto independence, unencumbered by some of its grandparents’
lingering romantic fantasies of a China united under a Nationalist banner. Chi-
nese foreign and defense policy is as likely to remain static, with Jiang’s contin-
ued control of the People’s Liberation Army through the Central Military
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Commission ensuring a continuation of China’s current strategy for reabsorb-
ing Taiwan.
Indeed, China’s apparent decision to forgo an amphibious invasion capability
in favor of a blockade force suggests that a direct attack is not even under consid-
eration. The Pentagon’s latest assessment of Beijing’s cross-strait military op-
tions says that China “likely would encounter great difficulty” conducting an
amphibious invasion throughout the remainder of the decade without a major
shift in national priorities.49 A buildup of amphibious capabilities would neces-
sarily be at the center of such a reallocation effort, but there is little discussion in
Chinese strategic literature of a need to develop such capabilities and even less
activity on the procurement side. In fact, despite its multiplying defense budget,
the Chinese navy has demonstrated only nominal interest in acquiring the troop
and cargo ships necessary for any large-scale amphibious assault.
By one academic study, China’s aging amphibious assault fleet includes a
mere fifty ships with full displacements of a thousand tons or more, with only
ten over two thousand and none over 4,800. Moreover, these modest numbers
appear to have already peaked; projections nearly halve the fleet’s amphibious
inventory by 2010.50 To be sure, hundreds of smaller military and civilian craft
could be launched on short notice from Chinese riversides and makeshift ports,
but such small craft, even if they managed to traverse the choppy 115-mile wa-
terway, could not transport armaments or men in sufficient numbers to breach
Taiwan’s vicious air and land defenses. By most informed estimates, China could
get one reinforced infantry division of fifteen to twenty thousand troops to the
shore, and another division of paratroopers over the island—far short of the
estimated three hundred thousand troops necessary to take and hold a beach-
head.51 A slightly more generous appraisal by a well-briefed congressional com-
mission says China can move two divisions by sea at best and that its capability
to insert airborne forces is limited to one of its three divisions at a time.52
Meanwhile, Beijing is pouring resources into blockading tools. In addition to
the fifty new short-range ballistic missiles a year opposite Taiwan, the PLA is re-
placing its aging liquid-fueled DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile with
the solid-propelled, mobile DF-21.53 It is also spending a large number of yuan
on a strategic modernization project that includes the development of land-
mobile ICBMs as well as a submarine-launched version, the Julang 2 “Great
Wave,” for the PLAN’s forthcoming ballistic-missile submarine—all key ele-
ments in a survivable and, thus, more credible nuclear deterrent.
China’s rapid succession of conventional purchases has been no less impres-
sive. Beijing’s $1.6 billion agreement to take prompt delivery of at least eight
more Project 636 Kilo diesel-electric submarines fitted with the Klub-S antiship
cruise missile system—its 186-mile-range comparable to a carrier battle group’s
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defense radius—moves the PLAN’s projection capabilities well beyond what its
troubled Song (Type 039) program promised alone.54 Taiwan has decided to ac-
quire as many diesel models from a yet-undetermined source, but all of China’s
eight submarines are scheduled to be delivered to the PLAN before 2010, the earli-
est that Taiwan’s first modern diesel-electric submarines are expected to reach ini-
tial operating capability.55 With an appreciably lower price tag (five to six billion
dollars) than comparable submarines the ROC navy might ultimately buy, the
Kilo purchase guarantees more defense planning and spending woes for Taipei.
The PLA budget has been climbing at a double-digit rate for twelve consecu-
tive years and will, the CIA judges, double by 2007.56 In contrast, Taiwan’s sus-
tained recession has produced draconian defense cuts. By Taipei’s own account,
defense spending as a share of the total budget has been halved over the last de-
cade, dropping from almost a third of all government spending in 1991 to an
anemic 16.5 percent in 2002.57 The spending debate in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan,
heated and frequently ill informed, reveals a parliament all but unwilling to
boost defense outlays. Predictably, the opposition Kuomintang and People First
Party appear committed to legislative obstructionism, but even President Chen’s
own party cannot be counted on to fund urgent modernization and readiness
projects. History suggests that Taiwan will ultimately find the wherewithal for
defense programs the United States deems critical to its security (as evidenced
by the tortured but ultimately successful Kidd-class destroyer purchase), but in
the short term the Republic of China has clearly fallen behind the mainland’s ag-
gressive acquisition timetable.
The poor state of U.S. readiness in this decade might similarly add to the at-
tractiveness of an early Chinese blockade gamble. Taiwan’s combat prepared-
ness has become notoriously bad, and U.S. readiness levels, though not yet dire,
have badly suffered from a war on terrorism that will undoubtedly last through
the decade.58 A heavier special-operations and intelligence-gathering mission
load since the 11 September 2001 attacks, for example, has strained the Navy’s
attack submarines, forcing the fleet to jeopardize their longevity and effective-
ness by skimping on critical maintenance and training.59 The global war on ter-
rorism has increased the demand for intelligence-gathering missions by attack
submarines by upward of 30 percent, and dwindling numbers will remain a
problem for years to come even with more Virginias (at $2.3 billion apiece).60
Notwithstanding slightly higher procurement rates, the Department of the Navy
estimates that the submarine fleet will stay flat at the 1997 QDR-recommended
level of forty-five to fifty-five compared with the target of sixty-eight set by a
1999 study for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further impeding the Navy’s ability to ex-
ecute blockade-busting campaigns reliably and quickly.61
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The attention of the U.S. military and its civilian leadership is understandably
focused on the Middle East. Emergency and supplemental spending bills are the
norm today and for the foreseeable future, redirecting money to maintain high
operation tempos and fill empty precision munitions bins at the expense of ba-
sic naval operating funds.62 The U.S. government may not be so distracted from
East Asia that its vital interests there suffer, but a costly, long-term war on terror-
ism, like the one President Bush publicly predicts, and a drawn-out occupation
of Iraq could ultimately lead to even riskier readiness gaps. Before stepping
down from the Pacific Command, Admiral Blair testified that the Navy’s readi-
ness levels, while generally improved since 2001 thanks to supplemental funding,
continue to suffer, particularly among aviation units and aging surveillance air-
craft, which had delivered “dangerously low . . . collection rates of required intelli-
gence information” in his domain.63 The full toll may not be felt for several more
years, but U.S. forces will nevertheless remain more susceptible to readiness prob-
lems than they would have under a peacetime engagement strategy.
As U.S. readiness and force structure issues entice China to act early, so might
a perceived cruise missile imbalance. At present, American surface ships have no
effective defense against the Sunburn and Yakhont, both of which travel at su-
personic speeds and execute terminal maneuvers designed specifically by Rus-
sian companies to overcome U.S. naval defenses.64 Currently, American surface
ships rely on the Standard Missile 2 and the NATO Sea Sparrow for cruise missile
defense at long ranges, and thereafter on the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System
and the rolling-airframe RIM-166.65 All of these systems would have difficulty
detecting and engaging China’s sea-skimming Sunburns and Yakhonts, which at
Mach 2.5 are nearly three times as fast as the American Tomahawk.66 The Navy is
working to plug this vulnerability, but the prospective solution, the developing
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile—launched from the Aegis destroyers’ Mark 41 Ver-
tical Launch Systems—will take time. The Raytheon-led international effort
holds considerable promise (having already been successfully tested against a
supersonic target drone) but is scheduled to undergo operational testing with
the U.S. Navy only in 2003 and will not yield a deployable system until 2005 at
the earliest.67 Beijing could prove unwilling to squander the military advantage
it will enjoy in the meantime, at least if it can overcome its own intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance problems.
In a similar vein, Beijing might feel under pressure to act before the United
States deploys a national missile defense system that might be effective against as
many as a hundred incoming nuclear warheads. New strategic delivery systems
are expected to give China a reliable second-strike capability by the end of the de-
cade, but a more aggressive U.S. missile defense program, supported by
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consistently higher spending, could give Beijing pause in a crisis. Optimistic esti-
mates suggest a fully capable missile defense system might be available as early
as 2008.68
Also, the final system could be even more effective than originally envisioned,
because the potential benefits for testing that come with the U.S. withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty have yet to be realized. Further complicat-
ing China’s deterrence strategy is Washington’s leaked intention to consider us-
ing tactical nuclear weapons in a Taiwan Strait war.69
All of these factors conspire to improve China’s offensive chances in the next
decade. More specifically, as shown in the figure, China’s military power will
peak relative to that of Taiwan and the regional forces of the United States some-
time between 2005 and 2008. In this window, improved naval and air capabili-
ties—including ballistic and cruise missiles—will give China its best chance to
effect Taiwan’s acquiescence. After 2008, Taiwan’s expected defensive gains and
the seemingly exponential military advances of the United States will preclude a
successful attack on the island.
DISCOURAGING AN ANXIOUS ADVERSARY
With all these trends warily in mind, Beijing will likely take action before its
odds become too long, even without assurance of victory (see the table below).
To prevent Chinese aggression, the United States should institute closer military
8 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
W
ind
ow
of
Op
po
rtu
nit
yUSA
ROC
PRC
2005 2008
U.S.-PRC military
gap widens
again
PRC-ROC gap
begins to narrow
PRC-ROC gap
expands, U.S.-
PRC gap begins
to narrow
2002 2011
M
il
it
ar
y
P
ow
er
CONCEPTUAL TIME LINE
17
Bernier and Gold: China’s Closing Window of Opportunity
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
ties with Taiwan, more cautious dealings with the PLA, and a strengthened naval
and air presence in the western Pacific, all the while taking sensible, complemen-
tary nonmilitary measures. The argument that such a “pro-Taiwan” policy will
exacerbate cross-strait relations, self-fulfilling a war prophecy, is flawed; it con-
tradicts the lessons of history and recent experiences with the PRC.
First, as recommended by the bipartisan, congressionally mandated
U.S.-China Security Review Commission, the Bush administration should con-
tinue to expand its military dialogue with Taiwan.70 These important exchanges
should enhance the interoperability of Taiwan’s command and control systems
for air and surface engagements, antisubmarine warfare, and eventually, theater
missile defense—key elements in a Taiwan antiblockade strategy. Issues such as
doctrine and force planning should also be covered, with meaningful
mentorships at the highest levels. The 2003 Defense Authorization Act requires
the Pentagon to report on the feasibility and advisability of conducting com-
bined operational training with, and exchanges of general and flag officers be-
tween, the U.S. and Taiwanese forces.71 If ultimately accepted and properly
executed, such an initiative could make Taiwan less dependent on the United
States for its immediate security while establishing interoperability in case
Washington is forced to stop a Chinese attack on the island. Given the U.S. mili-
tary’s multiplying resource commitments and defense responsibilities, such a
plan is morally compelling as well as strategically sensible. If President Bush
means to do “whatever it takes” to help defend the island democracy, the people
who live there should be as capable as they are willing to do the same alongside
American forces.
Giving Taiwan the ability to defend itself also means reestablishing its slip-
ping qualitative military edge. Taiwan has traditionally maintained a conven-
tionally advanced, if outnumbered, defense force; however, a lopsided
PRC-driven arms race fueled by destabilizing Russian and Israeli sales is quickly
eroding this advantage. Added to the bargains that have brought hundreds of
advanced land-attack Sukhoi fighters to China since the late 1990s, a $1.6 billion
deal with Russia to buy several dozen Su-30MKK Flanker naval fighters
equipped with the X-31 supersonic antiship missile does little to allay Taiwanese
fears that its maritime lifeline and the protective U.S. Navy are being targeted.72
These long-range multirole fighters could be particularly effective against
regionally deployed aircraft carriers or eastern Taiwan’s less-defended air and
naval facilities.
The robust 2001 arms package and streamlined acquisitions process for Tai-
wan proves that the Bush administration is committed to buttressing the island-
ers against attack, but more can still be done. The State Department, for
example, would have done well to respond to the latest Su-30 sale by giving
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Taipei direct control over its AIM-120C beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles,
which could help blunt a Sukhoi-led attack; yet the ROC air force complains it is
no closer to receiving the 120 advanced missiles it bought from Raytheon over
two years ago.73 Apparently to avoid Chinese protests, the State Department in-
sists on holding onto these first-line weapons unless a conflict erupts; however,
test-firings of the AA-12 Adder, a Russian-made missile comparable to the
AIM-120C, strongly suggest that this weapon is now operational in the Chinese
air force (which has possessed the weapon since 1999).74
The implications of the air-to-air missile imbalance should not be under-
stated. A computer simulation–aided study by California’s RAND Corporation
found that an unanswered AA-12 capability would give China an overwhelming
advantage over the ROC air force. The U.S.-China Security Review Commission
confirms that an Adder-armed Sukhoi fighter has an advantage over Taiwan’s
Mirage 2000-5 equipped with inferior MICA missiles.75 The AIM-120Cs are do-
ing little to protect the ROC or deter China warehoused in the United States.
Washington is also reluctant to sell Taipei the Aegis destroyers it craves, in
part because of clamorous PRC objections but mainly because the White House
thinks it can thereby tease out of Beijing concessions on cross-strait security and
nonproliferation matters. Using the destroyers as bargaining chips sounds dip-
lomatically clever, but China’s frenetic missile buildup and unending missile
technology transfers to states like Iran all but confirm Beijing’s unwillingness to
reform its behavior.76 The Aegis ships, then, are yielding no appreciable diplo-
matic leverage and might as well go to Taiwan while they can still make a positive
difference.77
The United States also needs to overhaul its military relationship with China,
especially with respect to a parade of “confidence building measures” that have
disproportionately benefited Beijing over the past decade. Before the White
House halted military-to-military ties after the EP-3 was forced down and its
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crew detained in April 2001, PLA officials attended elite American military
schools and enjoyed access to sensitive facilities, platforms, and force structure
information. By contrast, perfunctory U.S. visits to Chinese bases, ships, and
schools yielded few real insights into PRC capabilities or thinking, largely be-
cause of Beijing’s apprehension about revealing weaknesses. Drawing on its own
negative experiences with what it calls “extensive” Chinese secrecy, the Pentagon
has cautioned policy makers about wide knowledge gaps, conceding that “since
the 1980s, U.S. military exchange delegations to China have been shown only
‘showcase’ units, never any advanced units or operational training or realistic
exercises.”78 Similarly frustrated, the U.S.-China Security Review Commission
complains that “whether in the area of threat reduction, budget discussions, or
military to military exchanges, the Chinese pattern has been to absorb as much
information as possible and share as little as possible.”79
The moratorium has since been lifted, but it is as yet unclear if Washington
will demand equal access in the future. Military exchanges should continue,
but at a slower pace, as the security commission recommends, and only if
confidence-building measures and other ties are “strictly based on the princi-
ples of reciprocity, transparency, consistency, and mutual benefit.”80 Further-
more, military-to-military ties are useful only so far as they serve U.S.
interests; annual Pentagon “cost-benefit analyses” would allow the White
House and the Congress to judge such programs on their true merits.
Most importantly, the United States should adopt a strengthened Pacific
presence and response doctrine that leaves little doubt in Beijing over Washing-
ton’s will and ability to interject itself during a cross-strait crisis. This could be
achieved most traditionally (and inexpensively) with better regional basing in
the Pacific theater, where long distances between current bases and operating
areas strain resources. Added to the Guam-based attack submarines, an addi-
tional carrier battle group homeported in Japan or Guam would ensure access to
the area and make manifest the U.S. ability to defend Taiwan despite myriad
global commitments. Aircraft carriers and guided-missile destroyers serve as
constant reminders of U.S. power-projection capabilities, while submarines—
which potential opponents must presume to be present, even if undetected—
make a similar point in a subtler way.
The United States can no longer afford to leave the Taiwan Strait without an
aircraft carrier nearby. As one RAND study shows, the adequacy of U.S. Air
Force access near that hotspot is uncertain at best because of the distance from
South Korea and Japan, and because of those states’ unwillingness to avow open
support for the United States should it come to the aid of Taiwan in a confronta-
tion with China.81 New operational concepts like the Global Strike Task Force,
which emphasizes expeditionary dispersed operations, would help mitigate the
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Far East’s “tyranny of distance.”82 However Washington ultimately decides to ex-
pand and deepen its footprint in the western Pacific, the Pentagon should use its
improved presence to affirm the readiness and willingness of the United States
to counter strong-arm tactics in the area. In the face of a threatening missile test,
naval exercise, or mock combined-arms invasion, forward demonstrations will
clarify American stated foreign policy interests and thereby minimize misun-
derstandings and the risk of strategic miscalculation on both sides of the strait.
This fundamental approach to enhancing Taiwanese security is not one of
military “containment,” which would necessitate many more regional air bases
and naval deployments as well as a dramatic expansion of relationships with na-
tions like Vietnam and the Philippines. Neither does it preclude such nonmili-
tary measures as tighter dual-use export controls and attempts to curb or negate
Russian, Israeli, German, and French military sales to Beijing. All such basic ini-
tiatives—military, diplomatic, and economic—pursued in tandem, would help
discourage Beijing from using force to achieve its perceived destiny. They would
also regularly remind Washington that peace in the Taiwan Strait is far from in-
evitable and deserves its uninterrupted attention. First of all, however, U.S. civil-
ian and military leaders must dismiss the fatally flawed theory that time is on
China’s side in the struggle over the strait and recognize that the real danger of a
PRC attack is in this decade, when Taiwan is most vulnerable, not in the next.
Only then will Washington and Taipei act and plan according to a shorter, realis-
tic time line.
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